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Railhub Archive 1997-05-13 CTS-001 Channel Tunnel Safety Authority/Department of Transport0
Channel Tunnel Safety Authority report into Channel Tunnel fire published
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 Channel Tunnel Safety Authority
 Department for Transport
 Eurostar
 
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         Channel Tunnel Safety Authority report into Channel Tunnel fire published _______________________________________________________________

 related documents
type Press release note CTSA 02/97
The Safety Authority's report on the fire in the Channel Tunnel on 18 November 1996, published today, finds that the incident exposed fundamental weaknesses in Eurotunnel's management of safety which the company must recognise and correct at the highest level. Introducing the Report, Roderick Allison, the Chairman of the Safety Authority said: "This was a very serious incident although, thankfully, no-one was killed or seriously injured. Most of the equipment important for safety worked as intended and the emergency procedures were broadly satisfactory. However, the incident was more serious than it should have been because the emergency procedures were too complex and demanding and the staff on duty had not been adequately trained to carry them out. Eurotunnel have already accepted that these weaknesses must be remedied." The report sets out in detail the precise sequence of events during the incident, and describes the casualties and damage which resulted. It goes on to analyse and comment on the performance of the fixed equipment, the rolling stock and personnel. The report then sets out its conclusions and recommendations which number 36. Among the most significant recommendations are : Eurotunnel must abandon the present "drive-through policy" (i.e. the policy that, in the event of a fire, the train would in the first instance attempt to exit the tunnel so that the fire could be dealt with in the emergency sidings) and develop a new procedure taking account of possible failures of rolling stock or fixed equipment, the risk to following trains from smoke and the risk to those on the incident train due to the size of the fire at the time the train stops. (Recommendation 11) Eurotunnel must carry out thorough tests on all amenity coaches and locomotives, and correct any faults so as to ensure prevention of the ingress of smoke. All new rolling stock must meet the same criteria to prevent the ingress of smoke before they are brought into service. (Recommendation 12) Eurotunnel must improve the training of all of their staff in relation to the management of emergencies and develop a structured and practically based training programme to cover these needs. (Recommendation 17) Eurotunnel's Rail Control Centre Operators' training must be revised and improved. The additional training programmes must include training for emergency situations and with in-tunnel familiarisation visits. Training should be acknowledged with a certificate which confirms the level of competency attained. Refresher training should take place periodically. Any member of staff failing a competence assessment should be removed from duty, re-trained and retested. (Recommendation 28) Training by the Rail Control Centre Operators must be reviewed so that they may acquire 'by heart' knowledge of standard responses necessary for situations which are uncommon but potentially highly dangerous, so that the safety of people and the system can be assured without referring to written documents. Periodic exercises must take place in order to maintain levels of competence. (Recommendation 33) Eurotunnel must fully review Rail Control Centre procedures with a view to clarifying and simplifying the procedures to make them more user-friendly. Eurotunnel must allocate sufficient qualified personnel, in order to complete this task and commit itself to a time-scale. Eurotunnel must also carry out an analysis of the tasks of each operator in the Rail Control Centre to ensure that their tasks are carried out effectively in all circumstances. (Recommendation 34) The report makes no recommendation regarding change to the basic design of the existing HGV rolling stock although a number of recommendations are made affecting the on-board systems and testing of the locomotives and amenity coaches. The report recalls that the Safety Authority considered Eurotunnel's design proposals at great length in 1992-94 and that an extensive programme of experiments and tests was necessary, covering in particular : o fire detection o rate of fire development o the ability of the Tunnel ventilation systems to control air flow o emergency procedures o the rail traffic management system These points constitute key safety criteria for the system and it is against these criteria that the report examines the system's performance on the night of 18 November and puts forward its conclusions and recommendations. The report does not constitute authorisation for Eurotunnel to restart HGV services. The Safety Authority will be advising the Intergovernmental Commission separately about Eurotunnel's proposals for restart. NOTES TO EDITORS 1. The Channel Tunnel Safety Authority was established by Governments under the Treaty of Canterbury in February 1986 to give independent advice and assistance to the Intergovernmental Commission on all matters concerning safety of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link. 2. Immediately after the incident on 18 November, the Safety Authority set up a full Inquiry to ascertain the precise course of events, to examine the performance of the tunnel, fixed equipment and rolling stock, to analyse the handling of the incidents and to make recommendations. The Inquiry did not seek to explore the cause of the fire as this is being investigated by a French Judicial Inquiry. 3. The co-rapporteurs for the Inquiry were two members of the Authority, Mr Jeremy Beech, Chief Fire Officer of Kent and M. Pierre Desfray, Inginieur Divisionnaire des Travaux Publics de l'Etat in France, assisted by a number of technical experts. 4. The Channel Tunnel Safety Authority's report is published by The Stationery Office (ISBN: 011 551931 9), priced #35.00 and is available from: Stationery Office Bookshops Accredited agents (see Yellow Pages: Bookshops) All good booksellers It can also be ordered by mail order from: The Stationery Office Publications Centre PO Box 276 London SW8 5DT # = pounds sterling
Railhub Archive ::: 1997-05-13 CTS-001
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